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INTRODUCTION

The most noteworthy events in criminal law in Tennessee in
1975 were two decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court.' In
1. This survey encompasses state and federal decisions reported in the National
Reporter System during the calendar year 1975.
Occasional reference will be made to previous surveys, the complete citations for
which are as follows: Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1974: A Critical Survey, 42
TENN. L. REV. 187 (1975); Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1973: A Critical Survey,
41 TENN. L. REV. 203 (1974); Cook, CriminalLaw in Tennessee in 1972: A CriticalSurvey,
40 TENN. L. REV. 569 (1973); Cook, CriminalLaw in Tennessee in 1971: A CriticalSurvey,
39 TENN. L. REv. 247 (1972); Cook, CriminalLaw in Tennessee in 1970: A CriticalSurvey,
38 TENN. L. REV. 182 (1971). [Hereinafter these surveys will be cited as follows: 1974
Survey; 1973 Survey; 1972 Survey; 1971 Survey; 1970 Survey.]
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Kersey v. State,2 the giving of the Allen charge to deadlocked or
potentially deadlocked juries was disapproved, and guidelines for
such instructions fashioned after the ABA Standards Relating to
Trial by Jury were articulated.' In Baxter v. Rose,' the court
replaced the traditional "farce" or "mockery-of-justice" standard
for determining effective assistance of counsel with what was intended to be a more stringent standard. At the same time, the
distinction in standards between retained and appointed counsel
was abolished.' In the area of substantive criminal law, the Tennessee crime-against-nature statute was sustained against constitutional challenge by the United States Supreme Court.'
II.
A.

OFFENSES

Against Person
1.

Homicide

Several cases raised the issue of the showing of premeditation
required to sustain a conviction of first degree murder. In Sikes
v. State,7 the defendant had shot and killed his seventeen-yearold stepson. The fatal shooting was the culmination of a long
dispute, during which the deceased and the defendant had engaged in a fist fight and the deceased had fired his pistol in the
direction of the defendant. Although the defendant testified that
the deceased had been shooting at him at the time of the fatal
injury, other evidence contradicted this, including the fact that
the deceased was shot from the rear and was found with his pistol
in his pocket containing no spent shells. In sustaining a conviction for first degree murder, the court took special notice of the
fact that the defendant had fired two shots from a shotgun. It
reasoned, "The fact that the death weapon had to be manually
'pumped' before it could be fired the second time is a strong
indication of willful, deliberate intent to kill." 8 Notably, the court
did not address the issue of premeditation. While it might well
be concluded that the second shot was premeditated, that fact is
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 174-81 infra.
523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 123-32 infra.
See text accompanying notes 32-41 infra.
524 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. 1975).
Id. at 486. See also People v. Bjornsen, 79 Cal. App. 2d 519, 180 P.2d 443 (1947).
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immaterial if the deceased was killed by the first shot. Apparently the evidence did not clearly indicate which one of the shots
was lethal. Apart from this evidence, however, premeditation
might have been found in the fact that the defendant "stealthily
approached the house, carrying a shotgun loaded and ready to
fire." 9
A first degree murder conviction was also affirmed in Everett
v. State.'0 As the result of an exchange of words that took place
outside a grocery store, the defendant attacked the deceased with
a claw hammer. The deceased successfully avoided the blow,
whereupon the defendant reached into his pocket, removed a pistol and fired it, killing the deceased. The supreme court agreed
with the conclusion of the court of criminal appeals that the
defendant "'deliberately and designedly and premeditatedly
baited the deceased by some offensive remark calculated to infuriate him and provoke him to belligerence; . . . the defendant
planned and instigated this difficulty with the intention and purpose of creating an excuse to kill the deceased.' ""
In Suggars v. State,2 the court found that an initial claim of
innocence by the defendant coupled with a confession two days
later manifested premeditation. Judge Galbreath, dissenting,
suggested that the denial of guilt was no indication of premeditation.'3
9. 524 S A .d at 486. ,Thi....
is itself a,,mhiun,,s in light of the testimony of
the defendant that he was defending himself against further armed assaults by the deceased. The court concluded that the jury acted within its province in rejecting the theory
of the defendant.
Justice Henry, dissenting, found the conclusion of the majority unwarranted:
In my view either the defendant or the deceased could have shot the other
under a well-founded fear of death or the infliction of great bodily harm. It was
inevitable that this "running fracas" would lead to bloodshed. This tragedy
came as a result of their joint, mutual and concurrent criminal conduct. I am
unwilling to visit upon the survivor of this duel in the dark the penalty of a first
degree murder conviction and sentence.
Id.
10. 528 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1975).
11. Id. at 28. Justices Brock and Henry dissented. Justice Brock reasoned that while
anger induced in the defendant was insufficient to reduce the offense to manslaughter, it
did "negate a finding of cool deliberation which is essential to a finding of first degree
murder...." Id. at 29. Justice Henry concluded that there was no proof of premeditation.
12. 520 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
13. The fact that the defendant denied his guilt proves nothing. It is not
inconsistent with human nature that a person who has accidently killed another
under circumstances that would constitute involuntary manslaughter, or indeed
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Tennessee law on a different point may be affected by
4 in which the United
Mullaney v. Wilbur,"
States Supreme Court
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
was violated by a Maine rule that required a murder defendant
who desired to reduce the offense to manslaughter to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that the act had been in the heat
of passion or sudden provocation.
Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that
he deserves a significantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable
result in a society where . . . it is far worse to sentence one
guilty only of manslaughter as a murderer than to sentence a
murderer for the lesser crime of manslaughter. . . . We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of
passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. 5
The court stated that the requirement, existing in many states,
that the defendant must present "some evidence" that he was
acting in the heat of passion before the prosecution has the burden of negating that element is not affected by the decision."
Tennessee cases speak in terms of a presumption of malice whenever a homocide is shown, however, and thus place on the defendant the burden of demonstrating that the offense should be reduced to manslaughter. 7 Such a presumption would seem to be
inconsistent with the holding in Mullaney in a case in which a
defendant has "properly presented" the assertion that he was
acting in the heat of passion.
2. Rape
The degree of force required to sustain a conviction for rape
nonculpable homicide, might seek to evade detection as the killer. So the fact
that he denied complicity proves nothing except that he wanted to escape the
consequences, in so far as possible, of his rash act. The state of mind at the time
of the killing is the key factor.
Id. at 369.
14. 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881 (1975).
15. Id. at __, 95 S.Ct. at 1892 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at __, 95 S.Ct. at 1891 n.28.
17. See Hawkins v. State, 527 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1975); Humphreys v. State, 531
S.W.2d 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975); Bunch v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 481, 463 S.W.2d
956 (1970). See also 1973 Survey, supra note 1, at 511.
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was considered in two cases in which the accused had neither
brandished a weapon nor violently assaulted the victim prior to
the act of intercourse. Nor was there any explicit resistance by
the victim in either case. It is clearly established that the force
required for penetration is insufficient alone to support a conviction for rape. 8 In Lundy v. State, 9 the court held that because
the victim had been kidnapped and imprisoned by the defendant,
she was under a reasonable apprehension of harm and this satisfied the requirement of force.2 Similarly, in Lillard v. State,2' the
court concluded that if the victim justifiably feared that any
resistance would be met with the force the accused deemed necessary to accomplish the act, then the crime was forcible. The reasonableness of such a belief was supported in this case by the fact
that resistance to a second act of intercourse had been countered
2
by a violent response.1

A second issue in the Lillard case was whether multiple acts
of intercourse with the same victim could support multiple
charges of rape. The accused had been engaged in intercourse
with a second victim when the first assaulted him with a rock.
18. See 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 307 (1957).
19. 521 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
20. It would be an unreasonable misapplication of the law to require as a
matter of law that a captured female be required to incur a beating before it
could be said that demanded intercourse with her was rape. The force and
restraints inherent in the situation supply the forcible character to the act.
Id. at 594.
21. 528 S.W.2d 207 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
22. The persuasiveness of this point is slightly diminished by the fact that the
defendant had intercourse with two victims. While he was engaged in intercourse with the
second victim the first attacked him with a rock. The violence of the accused was in
retailation for this act rather than, at least immediately, for the purpose of accomplishing
the act of intercourse. While the accused thereafter engaged in another act of intercourse
with the second victim, he made no further advances against the first. The evidence,
therefore, is seen by the court as manifesting a violent disposition on the part of the
accused prior to the initial sexual assaults upon each. Wigmore observes, "Subsequent
hostility is . . . receivable; that it arose only subsequently is a matter for explanation by
the opponent." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 396 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original).
Certainly such an explanation is offerable by the defendant in the present case. The
matter is further complicated by the fact that the issue is not simply the violent propensity
of the defendant but the victim's reasonable apprehension of that propensity. The subsequent behavior of the defendant is scarcely relevant to the ultimate fact.
While the court chose to rely on the subsequent hostility of the defendant to demonstrate the use of force in the perpetration of the offense, the belief of the victim in the
futility of resistance might as easily be attributed to the defendant's statement prior to
either assault "that he had a pistol, that he was out on bond for having killed a university
professor and that killing them wouldn't matter." 528 S.W.2d at 209.
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He thereupon terminated the intercourse and assaulted the first
victim with his fists, threatening to kill her. Thereafter he drove
the second victim to another location and recommenced the intercourse. The court concluded that there were "[iun fact two separate rapes," and that the defendant could be convicted of both. 3
In support of its conclusion, the court cited Wharton's, 4 which in
turn had cited a single decision in support of the principle.2 5 In
that case, 26 the defendant had engaged in two acts of sexual intercourse in one county and then had driven to another county and
engaged in an additional act of intercourse. He was acquitted in
respect to the first two acts and pleaded double jeopardy in respect to the third act. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction,n holding that "each28 act of intercourse constitutes a
separate and distinct offense.1
Judge Galbreath, dissenting in the present case, quoted a
passage from Patmore v. States in which the court had said:
Even if it be conceded that two convictions and two punishments may be had in any case upon separate counts, the practice is not approved, and, certainly it must be clear that the
offenses are wholly separate and distinct. Our own cases appear
to prohibit the practice where the offenses grow out of one transaction and involve but one criminal intent3
23. Id. at 210.
[W]e do not agree that a man who has raped a woman once may again assault
and ravish her with impunity, at another time and at another place, as was done
here. An intent was formed to rape her again. The evidence of the second rape
is entirely additional to that of the first. Additional orders were given to the
captive female, an intent to have her again was formed and manifested and the
crime committed. Certainly there was separate and additional fear, humiliation
and danger to the victim.
Id. at 211.
24. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 304 (1957).
25. The present court cited two contra Oklahoma decisions that it chose not to
follow.
26. Mikell v. State, 242 Ala. 298, 5 So. 2d 825 (1941).
27. The charge given the jury in the Mikell case would probably be unacceptable
today under the authority of Ashe v. Swenson, 297 U.S. 436 (1970), which held that the
state was collaterally estopped from litigating a fact that had been decided in favor of the
defendant in a previous proceeding.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly reported that the Alabama
court found the second prosecution barred. In fact the Alabama Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
28. 242 Ala. at 299, 5 So. 2d at 826.
29. 152 Tenn. 281, 277 S.W. 892 (1925).
30. Id. at 284, 277 S.W. at 893.
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However, the context in which the issue arose in the Patmore
case was quite different. The defendant had been charged with
the possession of a still used for the manufacture of whiskey and
with the unlawful manufacture of whiskey. The court concluded
that the case came within the quoted rule since "the two offenses
were but parts of the same transaction, and evidence of the manufacturing affords proof of the possessing. '"31 Such an interrelationship of offenses was not presented in Lillard.
3.

Sodomy

The constitutionality of the Tennessee crime-against-nature
statute" was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in
Rose v. Locke.33 The respondent had been convicted under the
statute for an act of cunnilingus, and his conviction had been
affirmed against claims that the act did not come within the
statute and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.'
Thereafter he renewed the constitutional argument in a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, which rejected the contention 35 on the authority of Wainwright v. Stone.3"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, reversed, finding that "no reported Tennessee opinion had
previously applied the Tennessee statute to cunnilingus ' 317 and
apparently concluding that the respondent had received insufficient notice of the proscribed behavior. The court distinguished
,t&nne, holding that the Florida statute there involved "had long
been construed as proscribing '[t]hese very acts.' ,3
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that such previous
constructions of the statute were not a prerequisite to constitutionality.3 9 More important than such prior constructions was the
31. Id. at 285, 277 S.W. at 893.
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1955).
33. 423 U.S. 48 (1975).
34. Locke v. State, 501 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
35. See Locke v. Rose, 514 F.2d 570, 571 (6th Cir. 1975).
36. 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
37. 514 F.2d at 571.
38. Id.
39. "If that were the case it would be extremely difficult ever to mount an effective
prosecution based upon the broader of two reasonable constructions of newly enacted or
previously unapplied statutes, even though a neighboring jurisdiction had been applying
the broader construction of its identically worded provision for years." Rose v. Locke, 423
96 S. Ct. 243, 245 (1975).
U.S. 48, -,
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fact that the broader construction advocated by the petitioner
had been adopted in other jurisdictions ° and that there was language in prior Tennessee decisions favoring such a broader interpretation." Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart, each joined by
Justice Marshall, wrote dissenting opinions contending that the
respondent had been denied due process of law.
B.

Against Property
1.

Forgery

An essential element of the offense of uttering or passing a
forged instrument is knowledge that the instrument is false." In
Clancy v. State,4 3 the petitioner and a female companion went to
a sporting goods store and selected several items for purchase.
The companion offered what appeared to be a payroll check from
a restaurant in payment for the goods. The merchant refused to
accept the check or part with the goods and notified law enforcement authorities of the incident. Although the two were convicted
of offering to pass a forged instrument, on appeal the petitioner
contended that there was insufficient proof of knowledge on his
part that the instrument was false. The court of criminal appeals
affirmed the conviction, observing that " '[i]t would take a remarkably naive and ingenuous jury to accept as reasonable the
theory that this defendant had lived in intimate association with
his co-defendant, as he did, without the knowledge that she had
in her possession these checks . . . .""I The supreme court disagreed and reversed, finding neither sufficient proof of knowledge
nor even direct or circumstantial evidence that the check was
forged.
2.

Extortion

The question of the first amendment as a bar to a prosecution
40. "Anyone who cared to do so could certainly determine what particular acts have
been considered crimes against nature, and there can be no contention that the respondent's acts were ones never before considered as such." Id. at 244.
41. The court cited Sherrill v. State, 204 Tenn. 427, 321 S.W.2d 811 (1959), and
Fisher v. State, 197 Tenn. 594, 277 S.W.2d 340 (1955).
42. See Woffard v. State, 210 Tenn. 267, 358 S.W.2d 302 (1962); Keebler v. State, 3
Tenn. Crim. App. 447, 463 S.W.2d 151 (1970).
43. 521 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. 1975).
44. Id. at 783.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43

for extortion" arose in Moore v. State.4" The defendant and another had approached the manager of a grocery store and requested a donation to the survival program of the Black Panther
Party. When the manager advised them that he was without
authority to make such a donation and that the president of the
company was the appropriate party to contact, the defendant
said, "Well, I guess we will have to close them up." After a subsequent solicitation of a donation was equally unsuccessful, the
defendant and others set up a picket line at the grocery. The
defendant was convicted of extortion, and the conviction was
affirmed on appeal. Notwithstanding the fact that the picketing
was peaceful, a majority of the court submitted that means
"lawful in themselves, can be rendered unlawful by the ends for
which they are undertaken." 7 The court found that the purpose
of the picketing was to harm the business interests of the store,
and that "[tlhe defendant had no legitimate relationship with
the store whereby this purpose could be approved under the protection of the First Amendment."48 Judge Oliver, dissenting, submitted that since no contributions were made to the defendant
or any of his associates, the crime of extortion had not occurred.49
Moreover, the dissent urged that the conduct of the defendant
was fully protected by the first amendment.50
45.

The Tennessee extortion statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4301 (1955), provides:
if any person, either vprbally nr by written or printed communication, maliciously threaten to accuse another of a crime, offense, or immoral act, or to do

any injury to the person, reputation or property of another, with intent thereby
to extort any money, property, or pecuniary advantage whatever, or to compel

the person so threatened to do any act against his will, he shall, on conviction,
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than two (2) years nor
more than five (5) years.

46.

519 S.W.2d 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).

47.

Id. at 606.

48. Id. "It is apparent that the Red Food Store should have a free and unencumbered right not to contribute, in a free system, secure in the knowledge that no retribution
will be forthcoming under the guise of constitutional protection." Id. at 607.
49. In Swain v. State, 219 Tenn. 145, 407 S.W.2d 452 (1966), a conviction for extortion was affirmed under circumstances similar to those in Moore. In Swain, however, the
victim actually purchased space in the defendant's magazine.

50. Reasonable peaceful picketing lawfully urging boycott of a business
establishment, which does not improperly interfere with the public's right to
safe and convenient use of the streets and other facilities, nor violates proper
statutes or ordinances, designed for the protection of such rights of the public,
nor contravenes any paramount interest to the public at large or a valid public
policy of the state, is a constitutionally protected right of free speech and free
assembly and is not unlawful.

519 S.W.2d at 610-11.
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In a subsequent petition for federal habeas corpus relief' the
petitioner again alleged the unconstitutionality of the statute
under which he was convicted. The principal argument made in
the petition was that the statute was too vague to give fair warning as required by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In rejecting that argument the district court noted
that any ambiguities appearing on the face of the statute had
been corrected by narrowing interpretations in the state courts.5"
As an alternative ground for relief the petitioner again raised the
argument that had failed in state court: since the right to picket
is constitutionally protected, a threat to do so cannot give rise to
criminal liability. Agreeing with the state court, the district court
distinguished picketing or threatening to picket for the purpose
of extorting a payment and held that picketing for extortionate
purposes was not protected.
3.

Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property

In Whitwell v. State, 3 the defendants were charged with
grand larceny and with receiving and concealing stolen property,
both charges arising out of a theft of cattle. After deliberating for
some time, the jury reported that they were unable to agree. The
foreman said, "Judge, we've considered grand larceny and we've
all decided that the defendants did take and load the cattle and
they did have them in their truck but we don't think they knew
they were stealing at the time . . . We can't agree on anything
else."54 The court entered a verdict of not guilty on the grand
larceny charge but only granted a mistrial on the receiving and
concealing stolen property charge. The supreme court, however,
remanded the case for a dismissal of all charges. It reasoned that
the defendants could not be guilty of receiving stolen property
since they did not receive the cattle from anyone.5 5 In addition,
to be guilty of concealing stolen property, it was necessary that
the defendants knew the property to have been stolen. Since the
statement of the jury foreman indicated a resolution of that issue
51. Moore v. Newell, 401 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
52. See Swain v. State, 219 Tenn. 145, 407 S.W.2d 452 (1966); Furlotte v. State, 209
Tenn. 122, 350 S.W.2d 72 (1961).
53. 520 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. 1975).
54. Id. at 340.
55. See Deerfield v. State, 220 Tenn. 546, 420 S.W.2d 649 (1967). See also 1970
Survey, supra note 1, at 189.
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favorable to the defendants, they had effectively been found not
guilty of concealing stolen property.56
C. Against Person and Property
1. Burglary
Burglary as defined at common law requires an entering of
the premises with the intent to commit a felony.57 In State v.
Crow, " the court recognized that the entry requirement is satisfied if any portion of the body of the defendant enters." Affirming
the conviction, the court concluded that the record showed that
the defendant either reached through the broken glass in the
door, or, alternatively, inserted the instrument needed to break
the window through the opening. The first alternative would
clearly be sufficient to establish entry, but the preferred common
law view would distinguish an instrument used to accomplish the
entry from an instrument intended to be used in the subsequent
felony. The entry requirement could only be satisfied by the use
of an instrument in the latter category.6"
2.

Robbery

Scates,6 1 the

In State v.
defendant and a companion escaped
from a penal institution by overpowering the superintendent and
a guard with axes and gaining possession of a pickup truck,
which latpr was fnirl
anrroa
sneveral mniles away. The defendant was convicted of escape and armed robbery. The court of
criminal appeals found insufficient proof of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the truck, but the supreme court held
that the intent could be established by circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, it observed that, since a vehicle was taken, the "joyriding" statute, 2 which does not require proof of an intent permanently to deprive, was applicable. The defendant, however, was
56. Justice Harbison, dissenting, did not agree with the all-encompassing reading
given the statement of the jury foreman by the majority. 520 S.W.2d at 345.
57. See Davis v. State, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 77 (1866).
58. 517 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. 1974).
59. See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S LAW AND PROCEDURE § 401 (1957).
60. See State v. O'Leary, 31 N.J. Super. 411, 107 A.2d 13 (App. Div. 1954); State
v. Crawford, 8 N.D. 539, 80 N.W. 193 (1899); Russell v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 350, 255
S.W.2d 881 (1953).
61. 524 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1975).
62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-504 (1955).
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convicted of robbery, which is an aggrevated larceny. 3 By its
decision the court, without explanation, appears to have expanded the scope of the robbery statute to encompass an aggravated violation of the "joy-riding" statute.
The court was then called upon to reconcile Young v. State. 4
There a deputy sheriff was putting a prisoner in a cell with the
defendant when the defendant pointed a loaded pistol at the
deputy, took his keys, and then ordered him into the cell and
locked it. Defendant then escaped, discarding the keys in a field
adjoining the jail. He was convicted of escape and armed robbery,
but the supreme court found insufficient intent to permanently
deprive the owner of the keys. In Scates, the court concluded
somewhat feebly, "Probably [Young] can be distinguished factually from the present case where the accused obviously did
more than merely retard pursuit. We do not find it necessary to
overrule Young, but we are persuaded that to extend it beyond
its precise facts would be contrary to the public interest."" '
Public Offenses

D.

1. Interfering with an Officer
A conviction for the common law crime of interfering with an
officer was affirmed in Pope v. State." The offense had been
recognized, though not found proven, in an earlier case67 in which
the court had required a showing of the official status of the
officer, a lawful act by the officer, and an act of resistance by the
defendant. In the present case, the defendant was found to have
shouted and held the arm of an officer while the latter was making a legal arrest of two others.
2.

Conspiracy

In 1897 a statute was enacted making it a felony to conspire
63. See Freeman v. State, 520 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1975); Watson v. State, 207 Tenn.
581, 341 S.W.2d 728 (1960).
64. 487 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1972).
65. 524 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tenn. 1975); c. id. at 932 (Henry, J., dissenting).
66. 528 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
67. State v. Wright, 164 Tenn. 56, 46 S.W.2d 59 (1932).
68. Judge Galbreath, dissenting, found insufficient proof of the offense. 528 S.W.2d
54, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
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to take human life, inflict punishment or destroy property. 9
While the conduct proscribed was also covered by the earlier
enacted general conspiracy statute," the later provision carried
more severe punishment. In 1929, in Trotter v. State,7 the court
recognized that the statute had been enacted to thwart the activities of a terrorist group known as the White Caps72 and held that
the statute should be interpreted in that historical context. The
Trotter court concluded that, so viewed, the 1897 statute "was
not intended to deal with the ordinary crime of conspiracy." 7
This interpretation was followed in Presley v. State," in which
the court reversed a conviction for conspiracy improperly brought
under the statute.
III.

A.

PROCEDURE

Arrest

1. Probable Cause
Probable cause for arrest may arise from observations made
by an officer from a legitimate vantage point. In Smith v. State,75
the arresting officer was invited onto premises adjoining those of
the accused and from there observed marijuana growing in a box
adjoining the accused's mobile home. The court held that the
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1106 (1975):
Conspiracy to take human life, inflict punishment or burn or destroy property-Penalty. It shall be a felony punishable by from three (3) years to twentyone (21) years' imprisonment in the penitentiary and by full judgment of infamy
and disqualification, for two (2) or more persons to enter into or form any conspiracy or combination under any name, or upon any pretext whatsoever, to
takt human life, or to engage in any act reasonably calculated to cause the
loss of life, whether generally or of a class or classes, or of any individual or
individuals; or to inflict corporal punishment or injury, whether generally or
upon a class or classes, or upon an individual or individuals; or to burn or
otherwise destroy property or to feloniously take the same whether generally or
of a class or classes, or of an individual or individuals.
70. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1101 (1975).
71. 158 Tenn. 264, 12 S.W.2d 951 (1929).
72. "This organization burned property, took human life, inflicted corporal punishment, and terrorized communities in which it operated. Its existence had grown to be a
public scandal, and this drastic statute was passed with the object of destroying this and
all similar lawless conspiracies or combinations." Id. at 270, 12 S.W.2d at 953.
73. Id. at 271, 12 S.W.2d at 953. See also Asbury v. State, 178 Tenn. 43, 154 S.W.2d
794 (1941).
74. 528 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (1974).
75. 519 S.W.2d 407 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
69.
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observation provided a sufficient basis for the arrest of the accused and an incident seizure. 6
2. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
In Brown v. Illinois,77 the United States Supreme Court addressed a question that had been the source of substantial controversy in the state and federal courts:78 If a suspect is illegally
arrested, will the giving of Miranda warnings sufficiently dissipate the taint of the illegal arrest and thereby render any ensuing
statement of the accused admissible in evidence? The landmark
decision is Wong Sun v. United States,79 which concerned, inter
alia, the statement of one defendant given at gunpoint in the
course of an illegal arrest in his residence and the statement of
another defendant given several days after an illegal arrest but
while he was still illegally detained. The Court concluded that the
first statement was inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree
but that the latter statement was admissible because "the
connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' ,0
In Brown the accused was arrested for murder, without probable cause and thus illegally, and taken to the police station. A
short time thereafter he was given Mirandawarnings, and he then
waived his rights and confessed the crime. The Supreme Court
held that Miranda warnings were not sufficient, standing alone,
to neutralize the effect of an illegal arrest, and that to hold otherwise would largely eliminate the constitutional protection against
illegal arrest.8 The Court concluded that, under the Wong Sun
standard, the determination of admissibility of a confession fol76. See text accompanying notes 88-89 infra.
77. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
78. See J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: PRETRIAL RIGHTS § 171
(1972) [hereinafter cited as PRETRIAL RIGHTS].
79. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
80. Id. at 491.
81. Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for
questioning or "investigation," would be encouraged by the knowledge that
evidence derived therefrom hopefully could be made admissible at trial by the
simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid Fourth
Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect,
a "cure all" and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and
seizures could be said to be reduced to "a form of words."
422 U.S. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 2261.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

lowing an illegal arrest must remain a matter of evaluation of all
the relevant facts in each case, no one of which will be dispositive.52
3.

Hearing on Probable Cause

While reaffirming the principle that an arrest for felony may
be made without a warrant,8 3 the Supreme Court held in Gerstein
v. Pugh,4 that an accused detained for trial on an information, as
opposed to a grand jury indictment, is entitled under the fourth
amendment to "a judical determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." 5
Such a determination is not required to take the form of an adversary hearing, nor is it a "critical stage" in the prosecution requiring the assistance of counsel. Further, "although a suspect
who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause for
that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground
that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause." '
B.

Search and Seizure

1. Incident to Arrest
The most frequently employed exception to the warrant requirement is the search incident to arrest." For such a search to
be valid, the prosecution must demonstrate that probable cause
was present prior to the moment the arrest occurred; the arrest
cannot be retroactively validated by the product of the search. In
82. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities
of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to
turn on such a talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are an important factor,
to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by the exploitation
of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The
temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening
circumstances . . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct are all relevant.
Id. at __,
95 S.Ct. at 2261-62.
83. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 78, at § 15.

84.

420 U.S. 103 (1975).

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 119.
See PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 78, at § 44. The search must be spatially

confined to the area surrounding the person arrested. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); United States v. Hayes, 518 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Smith v. State," however, the court followed the frequently articulated rule 9 that a search may precede an arrest and still be
incident thereto if the prosecution can show that probable cause
for the arrest was already present.
2.

Plain View

A warrant is not required for the seizure of incriminating
evidence that comes within plain view9 provided the officer who
sees the evidence is in a place where he has a right to be. 9' In
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,9" the Supreme Court made the dubious pronouncement that for the plain view doctrine to apply,
the evidence must have been discovered inadvertently, that is,
unexpectedly. Although this portion of the Coolidge opinion garnered the support of less than a majority of the Court, it has been
followed by a substantial number of lower courts.9 3 The issue was
squarely confronted in United States v. Sanchez,94 in which a
state narcotics agent received a tip from a reliable informant that
he had observed heroin in the home of the accused. This information was received between 7 and 8 p.m., and a search warrant was
issued around 10 p.m. Shortly thereafter the informant again
called the agent and advised him that explosives would also be
found on the premises. Although the agent then contacted a federal agent who was an expert in handling explosives and requested his assistance in carrying out the search, no additional
warrant for the explosives was sought. Sometime after midnight
the search was carried out; no narcotics were found, but seventy
pounds of explosives were seized. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found the search illegal because the warrant only authorized state officers to enter the premises in search of narcotics.
Since there was probable cause to search for the explosives and
ample opportunity to obtain a warrant, the seizure could not be
validated under the warrant for narcotics.
88. 519 S.W.2d 407 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). See also Miller v. State, No. 31 Cocke
(Tenn. Crim. App. April 15, 1975), cited in ABSTRACT (Office of the Attorney General),
Sept./Oct. 1975, at 10.
89. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 45.
90. See id. at § 47.
91. See United States v. Cody, 390 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
92. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
93. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 78, at § 47 n.13.
94. 509 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Exigent Circumstances

Warrantless searches are frequently sustained because they
are found to be reasonable under the exigent circumstances doctrine.15 In United States v. Gargotto,5 two officers arrived at the
scene of a building fire and proceeded to collect evidence that
they believed might prove that the fire had been caused by
arson. The court held the search reasonable since at the time of
the seizure firemen were still hosing the area and there was a
substantial danger of losing the evidence.
In 1967 the Supreme Court held in Warden v. Hayden9 7 that
a warrantless entry of residential premises for purposes of arrest
may be reasonable if the officers are in "hot pursuit"9 and that
evidence discovered in the process is admissible. In United States
v. Holland,9 a detective followed footprints in the snow from the
scene of a robbery to a driveway from which it appeared that an
automobile had recently departed. When the driver of the automobile was located, he informed officers that another party had
also been in the automobile, a fact that was confirmed by the
dectective. Police proceeded to the home of the other party, entered without a warrant and arrested him. Holland was found
during a search of the attic and was also arrested. The court,
relying on Hayden,'0° held that these facts detailed "exigent circumstances" that came within the "hot pursuit" exception to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement. 0'
4.

Consent

A search may be carried out without a warrant if the party
See PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 78, at § 49.
96. 510 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Gargotto, 476 F.2d 1009
(6th Cir. 1973).
97. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
98. In Hayden, officers, acting on reliable information that the petitioner was hiding
in a certain residence and that he had weapons that had recently been used ina robbery,
entered the premises, arrested petitioner, and seized the weapons. The Court concluded
that "It he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of
an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." Id.
at 298-99.
99. 511 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
100. Judge McCree dissented, arguing that the majority was extending the concept
of hot pursuit beyond the facts and rationale of Hayden. Id. at 47.
101. Id. at 46. See also United States v. Rose, 440 F.2d 832 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 838 (1971).
95.
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in interest consents to the search.'0° Consent will not be found,
however, if the party has acquiesced to an apparent assertion of
lawful authority.0 3 In Kirvelaitisv. Gray,' 4 officers had probable
cause to arrest the accused for murder. They telephoned the
apartment in which the accused was living, and allowed the telephone to ring some fifty or sixty times, but received no answer.
They knocked at the door at three-thirty in the morning and
received no response. When the passkey failed to work, they broke
down the door, finding within a Mr. Riboczi, the tenant, asleep
in his bed. He indicated that the accused lived in the next room.
The officers entered the room with drawn pistols, found the accused under the bed and placed him under arrest. Both the accused and Mr. Riboczi were asked for permission to search the
premises, and both acquiesced. The court held that the consent
of the accused, given at gun point, was involuntary, but that
the consent of Mr. Riboczi was voluntary and was sufficient because the area searched was within the joint control of both parties.
Vehicle Searches

5.
"5

In State v. Parker, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed
its earlier restrictive interpretation of Carroll v. United States06
and held that if an officer has "reasonable or probable cause to
believe that a vehicle contains items subject to seizure" and reasonably believes the vehicle to be moveable, a search may be
undertaken. 0 7 The basis for the officer's "reasonable belief" in
this case was a very detailed tip by a reliable informant that the
accused had marijuana in his car. A few moments after receiving
the tip the officer observed the car weaving along the highway
and upon stopping the vehicle found the marijuana in the locations specified by the informant. In upholding the search the
court rejected its earlier holding in Tenpenny v. State'""that the
102. See PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 78, at § 50.
103. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
104. 513 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1975). See also 1974 Survey, supra note 1, at 208-09.
105. 525 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. 1975).
106. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
107. 525 S.W.2d at 130. See also Hughes v. State, No. 1545 Williamson (Tenn. Crim.
App. June 16, 1975), cited in ABSTRACT (Office of the Attorney General), Sept./Oct. 1975,
at 9, rev'd, State v. Hughes, 544 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1976).
108. 151 Tenn. 669, 270 S.W. 989 (1925). Tenpenny was decided less than a month
after the United States Supreme Court handed down the Carroll decision. The accused
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Carroll decision only applied to automobile searches authorized
by statute."'"
The propriety of a search of an impounded vehicle arose in
Hill v. State." Officers stopped the accused after they observed
him going through a red light and took him into custody because
he staggered and had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath.
Following standard procedure, the officers called a wrecker to
remove the car to the police station. Before the wrecker arrived
one of the officers searched the vehicle in order to make a list of
its contents and in the process found marijuana. The court upheld the admissibility of this evidence, saying that such searches
were not motivated by an intent to discover evidence of crime but
rather by a desire to protect the property of the owner of the
impounded car.'" The holding is consistent with a continuing line
of United States Supreme Court decisions admitting evidence
discovered during legitimate inventories of impounded vehicles."'
6.

Standing to Object

An accused may effectively waive any fourth amendment
objection to search of property by disclaiming ownership of that
property. In Miller v. State,"3 the accused was arrested with an
accomplice while in the process of a burglary. He informed the
police that he had no car and had come into Tennessee from
Ohio by hitchhiking. In a search incident to the arrest, however,
was driving a two-horse buggy at night when a car in which the sheriff was a passenger
drove by him. Upon passing the accused the sheriff observed the reflection of what appeared to be a glass jar under a.rug in the buggy. The sheriff then stopped the vehicle,
threw back the rug and found illegal whiskey which the accused was charged with transporting. There was no indication in the record of any suspicious activity on the part of
the accused or any informant's tip that gave rise to a reasonable belief that contraband
was in the buggy.
109. The court in Parker placed heavy reliance on the explanation of Carroll given
by the United States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
110. 516 S.W.2d 361 (1974).
111. "Moreover as pointed out in the attorney general's excellent brief, to have
surrendered the defendant's car to the wrecker company to be impounded by the city,
without making an inventory of the contents of the car, would have been neglect of a duty
resting upon the officer." Id. at 366. But see Depriest v. State, No. 1409 Humphreys
(Tenn. Crim. App. August 26, 1975), cited in ABSTRACT (Office of the Attorney General),
Nov./Dec. 1975, at 5.
112. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 1074
(1973); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
113. 520 S.W.2d 729 (Tenn. 1975).
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car keys were found which fit the door, ignition and trunk of an
automobile with an Ohio license plate parked at a nearby motel.
A search of that vehicle yielded incriminating evidence linking
the accused to another burglary. The court observed that although it would be a "close question" whether the search would
have been valid if the accused had given the correct information
about the ownership of the vehicle, it was a question which need
not be considered." 4
As a general rule one person cannot complain about the reasonableness or legality of the search of the premises or property of
another. Even if the warrantless search in question was illegal
or unreasonable under the circumstances, we hold that these
petitioners cannot complain of it, since they denied that the
automobile in question was theirs or that they had any connection with it. Had they given the correct information to the police
officers at the outset, the officers could have proceeded to obtain
a warrant, if one was in fact necessary; or, if the officer did
proceed improperly, the true owner or possessor would then have
had standing to question the search."'
C. Right of Confrontation
The most elemental instance of the sixth amendment right
of confrontation is the right of the accused to be present at his
trial." ' In Stone v. State,"7 on the second day of his trial the
accused, claiming that he was ill, refused to leave his jail cell to
come to court. Upon the advice of the jail physician that there
was nothing physically wrong with the accused, the trial judge
informed the accused that if he did not come to court the trial
would proceed without him. The accused still refused to appear,
and the trial was resumed. He appeared a few minutes later, after
the testimony of one witness had been heard. The testimony did
not implicate the accused, and his attorney had elected not to
cross-examine the witness. The appellate court held that the continuation of the trial in the absence of the accused was error. It
reasoned that if the trial court was convinced that the accused
114.
115.

Id. at 734.
Id. at 733.

116.

J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: TRIAL RIGHTS § 5 (1974)

(hereinafter cited as TRIAL RIGHTS].
117. 521 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
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was able to attend, it should have physically compelled him to
do so. While recognizing that the accused could waive the right
to be present, the court found no waiver in this case, apparently
because he had been given the option of remaining in his cell.",
The cotirt nevertheless affirmed the conviction because it found
the error harmless.
D.

Right to Counsel

1. Pro Se Defense
In Farettav. California,"I the United States Supreme Court
held that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that
a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense."' 20 The right to present
a pro se defense was thus legitimized not merely as the waiver of
the right to counsel but as a distinct substantive right "to make
one's own defense personally."'' The Court viewed the right to
the assistance of counsel as a "supplement" to this fundamental
right.22
2.

Effective Assistance

In one of the more significant decisions of the year, Baxter
v. Rose,2 3 the Tennessee Supreme Court abandoned the farce or
mockery of justice standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel and replaced it with the following test:
"[Wihether the advice given, or the services rendered by the
118. Judge O'Brien concurred, finding an effective waiver of the right to be present.
119. 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975).
, 95 S.Ct. at 2533.
120. Id. at
121. Id.
122. Id. at
, 95 S.Ct. 2534.
The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like
the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a
willing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling
defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon
the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant but a master; and the right to
make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists.
Id. See also Burkhart v. State, No. 350 Knox (Tenn. Crim. App. August 13, 1975), cited
in ABSTRACT (Office of the Attorney General), Sept./Oct. 1975, at 8, rev d, State v. Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365 (1976).
123. 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975).
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attorney, are within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.""' The court expressly declined "to establish any precise nomenclature or. . . lay down any specific standards or guidelines.'115 It nevertheless did indicate that it would
measure competence according to criteria suggested in United
States v. De Coster' ° for the District of Columbia Circuit' and
Beasley v. United States'5 for the Sixth Circuit.' 9
Tennessee has traditionally subscribed to the view that the
defendant can not raise the issue of effective assistance of counsel
124. Id. at 936.
125. Id.
We are content to leave the matter resting on a foundation of reasonable competence as tested by the authorities as herein set out. Trial courts and defense
counsel should look to and be guided by the American Bar Association's Standards relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice in general, and specifically to those portions of the Standards which relate to the Defense Function.
Id.
126. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
127. Specifically-(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay
and as often as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel should discuss fully potential strategies
and tactical choices with his client.
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take all
actions necessary to preserve them . . . . Counsel should also be concerned with
the accused's right to be released from custody pending trial, and be prepared,
where appropriate, to make motions for a pre-trial psychiatric examination or
for the suppression of evidence.
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and
legal, to determine what matters of defense can be developed. The Supreme
Court has noted that the adversary system requires that "all available defenses
are raised" so that the government is put to its proof. This means that in most
cases a defense attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own witnesses but also those that the government intends to call, when they are accessible. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. And, of course,
the duty to investigate also requires adequate legal research.
Id. at 1203-04.
128. 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
129. [Tihe assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is
counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. It is a violation of this standard for defense counsel to deprive a criminal
defendant of a substantial defense by his own ineffectiveness or incompetence.
Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training
and skill in the criminal law and must conscientiously protect his client's interest, undeflected by conflicting considerations. Defense counsel must investigate
all apparently substantial defenses available to the defendant and must assert
them in a proper and timely manner.
Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
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when counsel was retained by the defendant. 3 " In Baxter, the
court held that the sixth amendment right was "not necessarily
dependent upon state action,"' 3 and that the new standards for
effective assistance applied "with equal force to privately retained counsel and counsel appointed to represent the indigent."

32

Courts have frequently recognized that unreasonable restraints upon the use of counsel may result in a deprivation of
constitutional rights. '3 3 In Herring v. New York, 134 the Supreme
Court held unconsitutional a state statute that authorized judges
in non-jury trials to deny counsel the opportunity to make a closing argument." 35 The Court did not question the power to regulate
such arguments, however.

3

In Ray v. Rose, '31 the petitioner, convicted of the murder of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorneys had a financial interest in certain
contracts for publication rights to the story of the crime. 3M He
130. See Waggoner v. State, 512 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974); Long v. State,
510 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). See also 1972 Survey, supra note 1, at 604; 1971
Survey, supra note 1, at 273; see generally TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 116, at § 42,
131. Baxter v.Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 938 (Tenn.1975).
132. Id.
133. See TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 116, at § 41.
134. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
135. The only conceivable interest served by such a statute isexpediency. Yet
the difference in any case between total denial of final argument and concise
but persuasive summation could spell the difference, for the defendant, between
liberty and unjust imprisonment.
, 96 S.Ct. at 2555-56.
Id. at
136. The presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling the
duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. He may limit counsel
to a reasonable time and may terminate argument when continuation would be
repetitive or redundant. He may ensure that argument does not stray unduly
from the mark or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of trial. In all
these respects, he must have broad discretion.
Id. at __, 96 S.Ct. at 2555.
137. 392 F. Supp. 601 (1975).
138. Hanes, first-retained counsel, arranged a contract whereby Ray assigned to
Hanes 40% of the proceeds of a subsequent contract with Huie, an author. The subsequent
contract was entered into by Hanes, Huie, and Ray and gave Huie exclusive rights to
literary material dealing with the assassination. Huie agreed to pay both Ray and Hanes
30% of the gross receipts of the literary works. Later, the contract between Ray and Hanes
was amended to limit the amount received by Hanes to $20,000 plus expenses.
Six months later, Hanes transferred all of his rights to royalties from Huie to Ray,
and Ray transferred all of his rights to proceeds to his second-retained counsel, Foreman.
Foreman conditionally reassigned to Ray all of the royalties in excess of $165,500, the
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contended that they failed to pursue his defense adequately because it was not in their personal interest to do so.' 39 The federal
district court concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish
that the performance of his attorneys "was not at least of the
caliber of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal
40
law.'
E. Guilty Plea
To be effective a guilty plea must be voluntarily and intelligently entered by the accused. Two cases raised the issue of improper coercion exerted upon a confessing accused by his own
attorney. In Stout v. United States,'4 ' counsel induced the defendant to plead guilty by indicating that a lighter sentence would
be imposed upon a guilty plea than upon a finding of guilt after
a jury trial.'42 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[a]
plea is not rendered involuntary merely because a prediction that
a guilty plea will result in a light sentence does not come true."''
condition being that Ray would plead guilty without any unseemly conduct in court. Id.
at 606-07.
139. In the habeas corpus petition Ray maintained that Hanes "refused to hire a
professional investigator . . .[and refused to request a continuance because] their contract with Huie provided that they must go to trial within a certain number of days...
[and that Hanes] rejected Ray's expressed desire to take the stand and testify in his own
behalf because that would be giving away testimony that could be sold .
Id. at 60809.
Ray maintained, inter alia, that Foreman "refused to take any action to halt adverse
pretrial publicity . . .[and told Ray to plead guilty] even if he had not committed the
crime." Id. at 614-15.
140. Id. at 618. The court relied on Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.
1974), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the "farce and mockery" test
for ineffective assistance of counsel and held that "the assistance of counsel required
under the Sixth Amendment is counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance." Id. at 696. See 1974 Survey, supra note 1, at 223-24.
141. 508 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1975).
142. Appellant testified that after his motion to suppress the evidence of
handwriting exemplars taken from him had been denied on the second day of
trial, his attorney said, "... I'm sorry; I don't think I can beat the case . ... "
Appellant further testified that the attorney advised him to change his plea to
guilty. Appellant added that the attorney indicated that a guilty plea would be
met with a "couple of years probation," whereas a guilty verdict after a jury trial
might prompt the judge to impose the maximum 60-year sentence. Appellant
understood these choices and chose to plead guilty.
Id. at 952.
143. Id. at 953. Although counsel advised defendant that a guilty plea could be met
with a couple of years probation, the district court sentenced defendant to three years
confinement.
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The court recognized that a determination that the attorney's
advice "was not within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases . . ."I" could render the plea
"unintelligent" due to ineffective assistance of counsel, but found
that the defendant failed to meet the burden of proof in establishing that his counsel's competence was not within that range.
A similar issue arose in Ray v. Rose, 5 a habeas corpus proceeding attacking the validity of a guilty plea entered by James
Earl Ray. 4 ' Defendant asserted that the financial interests of his
attorneys'47 encouraged them to compromise Ray's defense and
coerce a guilty plea.'418 The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee concluded that, while the attorneys'
actions may have been inappropriate, Ray failed to establish that
incompetent advice induced an involuntary guilty plea.'49
144. Id.
145. 392 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
146. This proceeding was an evidentiary hearing pursuant to a remand by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1974), to determine whether the financial
interest of Ray's attorneys had prejudiced his defense. See 1974 Survey, supra note 1, at
214-15.
147. The details of the financial arrangements between Ray, the attorneys (Hanes
and Foreman), and the author (Huie) are described in note 138 supra. Huie entered into
an agreement with Dell Publishing Co. dated November 20, 1968, pertaining to a book to
be written by Huie about Ray. The court had the following to say about that agreement:
Two "special agreements," numbered paragraphs 19 and 21, bear noticing
herein. Number 19 provided that publication would not be sooner than four
weeks after the final Look magazine article; however, in any event, Dell could
publish the book on or after March 5, 1969. The book was not published until
May 20, 1970. This Court finds that the provision that Dell could publish the
book after March 5, 1969, was not a factor that directly or indirectly caused Ray
to plead guilty on March 10, 1969. In special agreement Number 21 Huie agreed
that none of the proceeds from the contract "shall directly or indirectly be used
for the benefit of James Earl Ray." Huie was either unaware of this proviso in
the contract or he was prepared to violate it when the book produced any
royalties.
392 F. Supp. at 606-07.
148. According to Ray, Foreman coerced him into a guilty plea because "book rights
would be of little value were Ray to have been tried and found innocent." 491 F.2d 287
(6th Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted).
149. The contract negotiated by Hanes is an apparent violation of Disciplinary
Rule 5-104(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar
Association, which was adopted August 12, 1969, to become effective on January
1, 1970. Furthermore, as this Court noted previously herein, if Foreman had
been able to collect the agreed amount of the fee, namely $150,000, this Court
is of the opinion that the fee would have been unreasonable. In the opinion of
this Court, it would have been subject to an attack limiting the amount of the
fee to recovery based upon a quantum meruit.
However, based upon the total proof, the irregularities of the attorneys
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F. Self-Incrimination
1. Discovery by Prosecution
In United States v. Nobles,5 the accused sought to impeach
the credibility of a key prosecution witness through the testimony
of an investigator who had previously obtained an inconsistent
statement from the witness. Over objection by the defense, both
the witnesses and the prosecutor were permitted to examine the
report of the investigator. During the presentation of evidence by
the defense the court ruled that the investigator could not testify
about interviews with witnesses unless the prosecution was supplied with copies of the pertinent reports. The Supreme Court
held that compelled disclosure of such reports would neither impinge upon the privilege against self-incrimination,'' nor infringe
upon the sixth amendment right to compulsory process and confrontation.5 2
2. Miranda Rights
The rights secured by Mirandav. Arizona 53 are only applicable when the accused is in custody.' Thus the warnings are not
required prior to general questioning at the scene of the crime.'
Additionally, the accused may waive the Miranda rights and
agree to talk to officials,'" and a refusal to execute a written
Hanes and Foreman and the potential and limited actual conflicts of interest
did not cause Ray to plead guilty involuntarily.
392 F. Supp. at 620 (citations omitted).

150.

422 U.S. 225 (1975).

15f. The fact that these statements of third parties were elicited by defense investigator on respondent's behalf does not convert them into respondent's personal communications. Requiring their production from the investigator therefore would not in any sense compel respondent to be a witness against
himself or extort communications from him.
Id. at -, 95 S.Ct. at 2168.
152. The District Court did not bar the investigator's testimony.. .. It merely
prevented respondent from presenting to the jury a partial view of the credibility
issue by adducing the investigator's testimony and thereafter refusing to disclose the contemporaneous report that might offer further critical insights. The
Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the
legitimate demands of the adversarial system. One cannot invoke the Sixth
Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth.
Id. at -,
95 S.Ct. at 2171.
153. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
154. See TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 116, at § 83.
155. See Braziel v. State, 529 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975); Suggars v. State,
520 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
156. See TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 116, at § 87.
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waiver does not preclude the waiver from being effective."'7 While
Miranda contains language suggesting that the warnings should
be repeated in some situations,'58 in Reaves v. State'59 the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that "[wihen a defendant
has been fully advised of his Miranda rights, it is not necessary
to repeat them on the following day before interrogation."' 60 The
admissibility of statements made to private parties is unaffected
by Miranda.'6

3.

Statements and Silence Used for Impeachment

The Supreme Court has held that statements obtained in
violation of the Mirandastandard may still be usable for purposes
of impeachment if shown to be voluntary.'62 The impeachment
exception came before the Court in two cases in 1975. In Oregon
v. Haas,'6 3 after the accused had been given proper warnings, he
expressed the desire to telephone his attorney. The officer advised
him that this would not be possible until they reached the station,
and thereafter the accused made an incriminating statement.
While ruling that the evidence was obtained in violation of
Miranda and therefore was inadmissible in the prosecution's case
in chief, the Court sustained the admission of the same evidence
to impeach inconsistent testimony given by the accused at his
trial.
In United States v. Hale,'64 the accused likewise was advised
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prosecutor asked the accused during cross examination why he
had not given the police his alibi shortly after the arrest. The
Court held that there was reversible error even though the trial
judge had advised the jury to disregard the colloquy, stating that
157. See Tilson v. Rose, 392 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
158. See TRIAL RIGwrs, supra note 116, at § 89.
159. 523 S.W.2d 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
160. Id. at 220.
161. Suggars v. State, 520 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). In a yetunpublished opinion, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that it did not violate
Miranda to admit testimony of an officer that the accused, after having been advised of
his rights and after having begun to make a statement, stopped and refused to make a
further statement. Jackson v. State, No. 432 Hamilton (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 1975),
cited in ABSTRAcT (Office of the Attorney General), July/Aug. 1975, at 2.
162. See TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 116, at § 98.
163. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
164. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
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"the probative value of the respondent's pretrial silence in this
case was outweighed by the prejudicial impact of admitting it
into evidence."'I6
G.
1.

Trial by Jury
Exercise of Right

The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the sixth amendment. As in the case of other constitutional rights,"'6 it is improper to penalize the accused for availing himself of the right to
a jury trial. In United States v. Derrick,' the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held it "improper for a trial judge to impose
a heavier sentence as a penalty for the exercise of the right of jury
trial, or as an example to deter others from exercising the
right." 6 '
2.

Discrimination in Selection

In Taylor v. Louisiana,69 the Supreme Court held that a jury
system that operates to exclude women from service 70 deprives an
accused of the sixth amendment right "to a jury drawn from a
venire constituting a fair cross-section of the community."'' In
so holding the Court overruled Hoyt v. Florida,7 in which a comparable statute had been sustained on the rationale that jury
service would substantially interfere with the distinctive role of
women in society. Avoiding a reappraisal of that assumption, the
Court explained that Hoyt had been decided under a fourteenth
amendment rational basis test, a justification it now found inadequate to limit a sixth amendment right to trial by jury. 7 '
, 95 S.Ct. at 2135.
165. Id. at
166. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (forbidding prosecutor to
comment on defendant's invoking fifth amendment right to remain silent).
167. 519 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975).
168. Id. at 4. "Such motives are objectionable because they are coercive and because
they have little if any relevance to the proper objectives of sentencing." Id. at 4-5.
169. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
170. While the statute did not exclude women from the jury, a woman would be
included only upon "written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service." LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC., Art. 402 (1966), repealed by 1974 LA. ACms, Ex. Sess., No. 20, § 1. The
statute had been repealed prior to the decision in this case.
171. 419 U.S. at 526.
172. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
173. In Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975), Taylor was held inapplicable to
convictions returned by juries impaneled prior to the date of its decision. The Tennessee

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

3.

[Vol. 43

Judicial Supervision of Jury Deliberations

In Kersey v. State,7 4 a holding of substantial impact, the
Allen charge was repudiated and guidelines were established for
dealing with deadlocked juries. After the jury had deliberated on
a homicide charge for an hour and forty-five minutes, it broke for
supper and indicated to the judge that it was making progress.
After eating, it deliberated for an undetermined period and then
reported that it did not appear that a verdict would be reached.
In response to a question from the trial judge, the foreman indicated that they were split eleven to one. The judge thereupon
gave the Allen charge, instructing the jury, inter alia, that the
minority should listen to the majority "with the disposition of
being convinced,"'' and the accused requested that the jury be
instructed that any juror with a reasonable doubt as to guilt
should vote for acquittal. This request was denied, and later in
the evening the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
On appeal the conviction was upheld by the court of criminal
appeals but reversed by the supreme court. First, the court held
that the trial judge should never inquire of the jury about the
Court of Criminal Appeals has held that Taylor does not eviscerate indictments returned
or pending on or before Jan. 27, 1975. State v. Daniels, No., 71 Shelby (Tenn. Crim. App.
Sept. 11, 1975), cited in ABSTRACT (Office of the Attorney General), Nov./Dec. 1975, at 3.
For a discussion of Taylor, see Daughtrey, Cross-Sectionalism in Jury Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1975).
174. 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975), noted in 42 TENN. L. REv. 803 (1975).
175. The charge derives its name from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
In the present case, it was given as follows:
While the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere
aquiescence in the conclusion of your fellows, yet you should examine the questions submitted with candor and with a proper regard and difference [sic] to
the opinions of each other. It is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so. You should listen with a disposition to be convinced to each other's
arguments. If the larger number are for conviction or acquittal, a dissenting
juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no
impression on the minds of so many other men, equally honest, and equally
intelligent with himself. The jury should not go contrary to their convictions,
but they should properly give heed to the opinions of their fellow jurors and by
reasonable concessions reach a conclusion which although not originally entertained by any of them, nevertheless, may be one to which all can scrupulously
adhere. In other words, the minority should listen to the views of the majority
with the disposition of being convinced. Now, with that addition we will work a
few minutes longer.
525 S.W.2d at 140 (emphasis in original).
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specifics of its split.' 7 Second, the Allen charge was held no longer
permissible:
[Wihen the effort to secure a verdict reaches a point that a
single juror may be coerced into surrendering the views conscientiously entertained, the jury's province is invaded and the
requirement of unanimity is diluted. We view these charges as
being tantamount to a judicially mandated majority verdict
which is impermissible under Tennessee law.'
Instead, the court directed trial courts faced with deadlocked
juries to follow section 5.4 of the ABA Standards Relating to Trial
by Jury."" Moreover, the court articulated the proper instruction
for such situations'79 and said "[sitrict adherence is expected
176. "The only permissive inquiry is as to progress and the jury may be asked
whether it believes it might reach a verdict after further deliberations." Id. at 141.
177. Id. at 144.
[Tihere is an inherent inconsistency in these charges in that the dissenters are
urged to reconsider their verdict and simultaneously are reminded to make their
decisions based upon their own convictions which they are cautioned not to
sacrifice. They ask the dissenters to consider shifting their opinions, because the
majority is of a different persuasion. We find no merit to any suggestion that
might necessarily makes right. We take note of the classic lines: NOR IS THE
PEOPLE'S JUDGMENT ALWAYS TRUE. THE MOST MAY ERR AS
GROSSLY AS THE FEW. (J. Dryden, Absalom and Achitophel).
Id.
178. Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury. (a) Before the jury retires
for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to deliberate with a view to reaching an
agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to
reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight
or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors,
or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court
may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an
instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten
to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it
appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (1968).
179. The instruction approved by the court was as follows:
The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order
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and variations will not be permissible."'"" The court added that
if this instruction is originally given as part of the main charge,
it may be repeated in the event of a deadlock.''
H.

Fair Trial

1. Discovery
5
The Tennessee Supreme Court held in State v. Gaddis'
that
3
under the Tennessee discovery statute' an accused in a drug case
is entitled to a sample of the subject drug for independent chemical examination and analysis.

2.

Improper Argument
4
8

In Smith v. State, in a prosecution for armed robbery, "the
prosecutor addressed some jurors by name and asked if they were
afraid to go out to dinner with their wives, or answer their doorbell, or stop at a street light for fear of the criminal element." ' '
At another point he recommended a sentence of five hundred
years, for reasons he suggested the defendant would not want
divulged.8 " The court concluded that "[tihe cumulative impact
to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your verdict
must be unanimous.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with
a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual
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an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course
of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change
your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest
conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of
your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
525 S.W.2d at 145.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 530 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1975).
183. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2044 (1975).
184. 527 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. 1975).
185. Id. at 738.
186. The court commented:
These statements could have been taken by the jury to mean that they should
set the punishment at a high number of years, rather than at a life sentence, in
order to extend the time before the defendants could become eligible for parole.
Any reference to parole possibilities during argument would have been
improper. See Graham v. State, 202 Tenn. 423, 304 S.W.2d 622 (1957). We
cannot condone any method, albeit an indirect one, that seeks to achieve that
prohibited goal.
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of the various statements . . . undoubtedly had a prejudicial
effect on the jury."'"7 The harmful effect, however, was seen to
extend to punishment only, not to guilt, and thus the only relief
granted was a reduction in sentence from twenty-five years to a
minimum of ten years."8 8
I.

Probation

In Stiller v. State,"9 the court held that the decision of a trial
judge to suspend sentence and place the defendant on probation
is subject to judicial review, a result the court deemed necessary
to guard against abuse of discretion by sentencing judges. The
defendant had pleaded guilty to charges of forging $26,000 in
bank notes, embezzling $65,740, and making false entries showing fictitious loans of $45,000. The trial judge suspended sentence and placed the defendant on probation for ten years with
the condition that all confiscated funds be restored within a year.
The prosecution appealed the suspension of sentence, and the
court of criminal appeals agreed that the trial court had abused
its discretion. The supreme court, after holding that appellate
review was appropriate, reversed, agreeing with Judge Russell,
dissenting below, that the absence of the report of the probation and parole officer made it impossible to evaluate the decision
of the trial judge. 9 0 In any event, the "enormity of this defendant's crime," upon which the court of criminal appeals principally relied, was but one of a number of factors to be considered
in deciding whether to grant probation. 9 '
187. Id. at 739.
188. In Beasley v. State, No. 1665 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 1975) the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction because the district attorney had
argued that the alibi witnesses were liars. The Tennessee Supreme Court subsequently
reversed the decision. State v. Beasley, 536 S.W.2d 328 (1976), noted in 43 TENN. L. REV.
707 (1976).
189. 516 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. 1974).
190. The court added:
We should observe, parenthetically, at this point that attaching the probation
report as an appendix to the brief filed by petitioner's counsel not only is ineffectual to bring it to the attention of the Court, it is improper and we admonish
counsel against a repetition of this procedure. Since the report is not properly
before us, no member of the Court knows its contents.
Id.at 622.
191. "Other statutory considerations are the defendant's criminal record, social
history, present condition and, in proper cases, his physical and mental condition. Presumably these matters were discussed in the probation report." Id. at 621.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court has been less than consistent
in determining whether multiple offenses arising out of the same
92
transaction may be separately prosecuted. In Wells v. State,'
police seized heroin, cocaine and marijuana in a single search of
the home and automobile of the accused. The court held that,
although the possession of each substance was a separate felony,
only one possession could be charged in the absence of proof that
each was acquired by separate acts.
A novel issue was presented in Pearson v. State:' 3 can the
same felony convictions be used as a basis for separate habitual
criminal convictions? In Pearsonthe accused was convicted of his
third felony and of being an habitual criminal.'94 While free on
bond pending appeal, he committed a fourth felony. He was convicted of this offense and also of being an habitual criminal even
though the habitual criminal conviction rested in part upon the
same two felonies that had been the basis for the earlier habitual
criminal conviction. The court held that this did not subject the
defendant to double jeopardy "[s]ince habitual criminality is a
status or a vehicle for the enhancement-of punishment, incidental
to and dependent upon the most recent conviction, as opposed to
an independent crime .... 9'195
2.

Greater Charge Following Vacation of Guilty Plea

In McGlothlin v. State,'99 the accused had pleaded guilty to
three indictments of third degree burglary but successfully
attacked the judgment in federal court by establishing that he
had entered the pleas under the mistaken impression that the
sentences would run concurrently. He then went to trial and was
convicted on one charge of first degree burglary. The court reversed the conviction, holding that prosecution should have been
192. 517 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. 1974). For a discussion of Tennessee law regarding the
identity of offenses, see Comment, Identity of Criminal Offenses in Tennessee, 43 TENN.
L. REV. 613 (1976).
193. 521 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. 1975).
194. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2801 to -2807 (1975).
195. 521 S.W.2d at 227.
196. 521 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
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limited to the less serious crime to which he had originally
pleaded guilty." 7
3.

Greater Sentence on Retrial

9 8 at the second
In Sommerville v. State,1
trial of the defendant, the jury convicted and imposed a sentence in excess of that
imposed at the first trial. None of the jurors were aware of the
previous sentence. While acknowledging that it was free to impose a higher standard of protection than that mandated by the
United States Supreme Court, the Tennessee Supreme Court
chose to follow the determination in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe'9I
that the Pearce rule,2°0 which precludes the imposition of a
harsher sentence on retrial, is inapplicable to jury-determined
sentences "absent knowledge of the prior sentence." '0 The court
saw no reason to believe "that jurors are more immune to the
human trait of vindictiveness than judges." 202 Thus the court held
that any potential juror with knowledge of the prior verdict and
sentence is subject to challenge for cause "unless the examination
shows, unequivocally, that he can be impartial, and that his
judgment will not be affected by such knowledge.120 The examination is to take place outside the presence of other jurors and
prospective jurors. Objection to the seating of a particular juror
will not be heard on appeal if no challenge was made at trial, nor
if a challenge was made and not sustained, unless all peremptory
challenges had been used at the time. The court remanded the
case for resentencing by the trial court pursuant to statute,20 4 the
sentence to be identical to that imposed by the first jury.

197. Id. at 54. Judge Oliver dissented, contending that third-degree burglary was not
a lesser included offense of first-degree burglary. The majority considered this a matter
of indifference under the authority of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
198. 521 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. 1975).
199. 412 U.S. 17 (1973), discussed in 1973 Survey, supra note 1, at 249.
200. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
201. 521 S.W.2d at 796.
202. Id. at 797.
Granted a judge who has been reversed has a possible motivation for retaliation
not attributable to jurors, but the prophylactic rule of Pearce is designed to
eliminate the possibility of vindictiveness. At the conclusion of the second trial,
having determined that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, knowledge of a prior jury's sentence on the same charge is almost certain to be a factor
given some consideration and providing potential vindictiveness.
Id.
203. Id.
204. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2701 (1975).
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Appeal by Prosecution

Three United States Supreme Court decisions considered the
propriety of appeals by the prosecution in criminal cases. In
United States v. Wilson,2 5 the accused was found guilty of converting union funds to his own use. Following the verdict, the trial
judge reversed an earlier ruling and dismissed the indictment on
the ground that there had been an unreasonable preindictment
delay. The government sought to appeal this ruling, and the Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, held that it was
entitled to do so. The Court was not prepared to recognize a right
to appeal by the prosecution for all errors of law, particularly in
cases in which a favorable ruling would result in a new trial. 20 6 No
such possibility was raised in the present case, however, because
a ruling favorable to the prosecution would merely have resulted
in a reinstatement of the judgment of guilt.
On the same day the Court decided United States v.
Jenkins,20 7 in which, at the conclusion of a non-jury trial, the
court had filed written findings of fact and then dismissed the
indictment. Here the Court distinguished Wilson because in
Jenkins there was uncertainty as to whether the dismissal was the
result of a ruling on the law of the case or a determination that
the statute in question was inapplicable to the defendant as a
matter of fact. Even if no additional evidence would have to be
taken, the trial court would have to make supplemental findings,
and the Court concluded that any further proceedings would violate the protection against double jeopardy.
In Serfass v. United States, 05 the accused, who had not
waived his right to a jury trial, was granted a pretrial motion to
dismiss the indictment. The trial court reached its decision upon
facts contained in a stipulation and in an affidavit supporting the
motion. The Supreme Court held that an appeal of the ruling by
the prosecution was not barred by the double jeopardy clause
205. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
206. Granting the Government such broad appeal rights would allow the
prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after
having failed with the first; it would permit him to re-examine the weaknesses
in his first presentation in order to strengthen it in the second; and it would
disserve defendant's legitimate interest in the formality of a verdict of acquittal.
Id. at 352.
207. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
208. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
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because the accused had never been "put to trial before the trier
of facts." 09 Since the right to a jury trial had not been waived,
the trial court could not make a determination as to guilt. Moreover, the reliance on extraneous facts by the trial court was not
the functional equivalent of an acquittal, since jeopardy had
never attached.
A recent Tennessee decision confirmed that the prosecution
will not be permitted to appeal for a trial de novo following an
adverse decision on the merits. In Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County v. Miles,210 the accused was
charged with interfering with a police officer. The case was heard
on the merits in a general sessions court and dismissed. The prosecution appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. The
circuit court dismissed the appeal under the double jeopardy
clause, and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed."'
209. Id. at 389.
210. 524 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. 1975).
211. [A] proceeding in a municipal court for the imposition of a fine upon
a person for allegedly violating a city ordinance is criminal rather than civil in
substance, in that, it seeks punishment to vindicate public justice and, therefore, constitutes jeopardy under the double-jeopardy clauses of the Tennessee
and Federal Constitutions and, consequently, the alleged offender, whether acquitted or convicted, cannot again be tried for the same offense in a state trial
court of general jurisdiction over the timely objection of the defendant.
Id. at 660.

